We introduce time-varying systemic risk in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model to study whether a simple leaning-against-the-wind policy can reduce systemic risk and improve welfare. We find that an unexpected increase in policy rates reduces output, inflation, and asset prices without fundamentally mitigating financial risks. We also find that while a systematic monetary policy reaction can improve welfare, it is too simplistic: (1) it is highly sensitive to parameters of the model and (2) is detrimental in the presence of falling asset prices. Macroprudential policy, similar to a countercyclical capital requirement, is more robust and leads to higher welfare gains. 

While financial intermediaries (which include both banks and non-banks) are owned by households, they are operated by managers who maximize the return on intermediaries' equity. This friction results in pro-cyclical risk-taking behavior in the financial sector.
It is difficult to raise funds during periods of financial stress. This friction introduces an asymmetry: in bad times a fall in asset prices that lowers the return on equity makes it difficult to raise funds, whereas no such equity constraint exists in good times.
Taken together these frictions and their interaction with the real economy generate systemic risks: a fall in asset prices that induces a sufficiently large decline in the return on financial intermediaries' equity renders them unable to raise equity. As a result, their portfolio becomes riskier, prompting risk averse managers to require higher risk-adjusted returns in the future (the Sharpe ratio increases). To deliver the higher expected returns the price of capital must decline. Lower asset prices propagate the financial stress to the real economy by reducing the volume of investment in physical capital which results in a further deterioration in the macroeconomic environment, raising the possibility of a vicious cycle.
We calibrate the model to approximate observed macroeconomic and financial sector data. Extending He and Krishnamurty (2014) and following Adrian and Shin (2013), we assume that financial intermediaries expand their balance sheet by borrowing. As a result, financial sector leverage and asset prices move in the same direction over the business cycle.
We use the model as a laboratory to analyze the effects of simple monetary policy rules that include leverage on financial variables, systematic risk and, more generally, welfare. We limit our analysis to simple policy rules to proxy a monetary policy behavior which could be, in principle, sufficiently predictable and learnable in a more general context. This also leads us to focus our analysis on observable measures of systemic risk such as leverage. We compare results from using simple policy rules to results from using countercyclical macro-prudential policy to lean against leverage.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows:
We find that an unexpected increase in policy rates reduces output, inflation, and asset prices without fundamentally mitigating financial risks.
 However, a systematic monetary policy that progressively reacts to financial risks can improve welfare. The private sector responds to the expectation of a policy response by taking fewer risks. For example, a simple (Taylor type) policy rule that incorporates financial sector leverage can improve welfare by sacrificing a modest amount of growth today in order to significantly reduce the risk of economically costly financial crises in the future.
 While a systematic monetary policy reaction based on a simple policy rule that leans against leverage can improve welfare, we find that it is too simplistic. First, the benefits from leaning against leverage are is sensitive to parameters of the model, such as the degree to which financial sector leverage is pro or counter-cyclical. Second, leaning against leverage is detrimental in the presence of falling asset prices, potentially exacerbating incipient financial stress.
In comparison, macroprudential policy, similar to a countercyclical capital requirement, is more robust and leads to significantly higher welfare gains, largely because, unlike policy rates, it is unburdened with trying to also achieve inflation and output objectives at the same time.
In sum, we find that in theory, systematic monetary policy can be used to reduce systemic financial stability risks if other, more targeted policy options (such as macroprudential policies) are a not available. However, practical implementation is faced with substantial challenges that are largely outside the scope of this study. For example, policymakers may find it difficult to systematically identify and measure rising financial excesses in a timely manner.
Prior to the great …nancial crisis the mainstream view held among central banks was that using interest rate policy to counteract …nancial exuberance (such as asset price bubbles) was costly or ine¤ective (Bernanke and Gertler [7] , Gilchrist and Leahy [22] , Greenspan [24] ). 1 The global …nancial crisis (GFC), however, has put this "benign neglect" approach into question, bringing the issue of whether monetary policy should explicitly include …nancial stability as an independent objective and use (some) speci…c …nancial variables as intermediate targets to the forefront of the policy debate (Borio [9] ). There is now, indeed, the widely held belief that the current …nancial architecture is inherently fragile and that widespread externalities-stemming from some form of asset price corrections-can have a systemic impact on the …nancial sector, disrupting …nancial intermediation and, in turn, jeopardizing the normal functioning of the real economy (Adrian et al [2] ).
We re-assess the optimal monetary policy conduct when the …nancial intermediation sector can be subject to disruptions which would then trigger adverse e¤ects for the real economy. These systemwide …nancial disruptions are rare but highly damaging. To capture them appropriately we use a framework that accommodates potentially highly non-linear behavior of …nancial variables and their two-way interaction with the real economy. As a result, it is important to assess monetary policy in a model in which …nancial constraints on the intermediary sector only bind in some "bad" states. More speci…cally, we introduce time-varying systemic risk in an otherwise standard New-Keynesian model that can approximate data for macroeconomic and …nancial variables. In particular, following He and Krishnamurthy [28] we include two …nancial frictions: 1) there is a separation between ownership and management of …nancial intermediaries which induces a excessively pro-cyclical risk-taking behavior of the …nancial sector; 2) there is an equity constraint which makes it di¢ cult for …nancial intermediaries to raise funds during periods of …nancial stress. This occasionally binding constraint introduce a substantial asymmetry between good and bad times.
Bad states can morph into a …nancial crisis due to a negative feedback loop e¤ect: an initial drop in asset prices that induces a su¢ cient fall in the return on equity of the …nancial sector to make the equity constraint bind; the di¢ culty of raising equity implies, in turn, that the intermediary sector will bear more risk in its portfolio and the Sharpe ratio will rise-analog to a rise in risk 1 Moreover, the additional information brought about by …nancial variables relatively to the one already incorporated in in ‡ation and output gap was considered minimal and occasional …nancial disruptions could be dealt with by following the traditional lender-of-last-resort function (Bagehot [5] ).
aversion. A higher Sharpe ratio on capital investment, in turn, implies that the price of capital must be lower in order to deliver the higher expected returns. Lower asset prices propagates the …nancial stress to the real economy by reducing the volume of investment in physical capital which in turn deteriorate further the macroeconomic environment and raise the probability of a vicious cycle.
Extending He and Krishnamurthy [28] and following Adrian and Shin [1] , our baseline calibration assumes that …nancial intermediaries expand their balance sheet by borrowing rather than raising equity, which results in a positive co-movement between leverage and asset prices. 2 Empirical evidence suggests that …nancial sector leverage is indeed pro-cyclical, although results vary across sectors and over time. For example, using pre-crisis aggregate …nancial accounts data, Adrian and Shin [1] …nd that leverage increases with total assets for broker-dealers. This result is con…rmed by Nuno and Thomas [33] , who extend data up to 2011 and …nd evidence that leverage is procyclical for both broker dealers and for commercial banks. Finally, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [29] use pre-crisis microdata and …nd that leverage is procyclical for investment banks and for large commercial banks; similar to Greenlaw et al. [23] (who look at a few individual banks). Our model is rich enough to qualitatively replicate the cross-correlation between leverage and output found in the data. Speci…cally, leverage lags output and is more persistent over the business cycle. 3 Finally, we use a third order solution method to account for changes in risk premia and tail events which contribute to the …nancial intermediaries'choices about leverage and risk taking, and the vulnerability of the …nancial sector. Capturing non-linear behavior of macroeconomic variables in periods of …nancial stress is crucial to properly evaluating the welfare costs related to systemic risk.
We use our model as a laboratory to analyze the e¤ect of simple monetary policy rules on the stochastic properties of …nancial variables, systematic risk and, more generally, welfare. We limit our analysis to simple rules to proxy a monetary policy behavior which could be, in principle, su¢ ciently predictable and learnable in a more general context-i.e., we proxy a central bank operating in a framework that is consistent with the general principles of a ‡exible in ‡ation targeting 2 See BIS [6] for a detailed survey of alternative transmission channels between the …nancial and the real sectors.
Risk taking in our framework occurs on the liability side of banks. Another interesting margin of risk taking is asset quality. For an example of a DSGE model with a search-for-yield among banks see Cociuba, Shukayev and Ueberfeldt [15] . 3 Some commentators have noted that the asynchronicity of business cycle ‡uctuations and the …nancial cycle (de…ned as ‡uctuations in some chosen …nancial variables) poses a challenge to monetary policy (see Borio [9] Finally, an excessive stabilization of output leads to a compression of risk premia, higher asset prices, investment levels, and, thus, leverage (which is necessary to …nance the higher investment levels). When the …nancial system faces sharper negative shocks, however, the higher leverage becomes a vulnerability leading to sharper downturns. This feature is analog to the volatility paradox described in Brunnermeier and Sannikov [10] . 4 In this context, a monetary policy reaction to output over and above the one warranted in the absence of …nancial frictions leads to lower welfare.
In relation to the literature most existing studies have found little or no welfare bene…t from monetary policy targeting (or "leanings against") …nancial variables. 5 However, di¤erently from ours, these studies are subject to several limitations: credit frictions a¤ect only non-…nancial borrowers (as in models a la Kiyotaki [3] ), focus on the e¤ect of a monetary policy surprises on systemic risk …nding little or negligible welfare gains. In the present paper, instead, we will place more emphasis on how a systematic monetary policy reaction to …nancial variables, which is fully internalized by private agents, can a¤ect welfare, while broadly con…rming the results of Svensson [39] and Ajello et al [3] in relation to a surprise policy tightening. 6 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section II and calibrate the model and describe how the model matches the data for key macro and …nancial variables in section III. We discuss model properties and perform welfare analysis for alternative policy rules in section IV before concluding with a summary of our results in section V 4 The volatility paradox can be described by the following passage: "Paradoxically, lower exogenous risk can lead to more extreme volatility spikes in the crisis regime. This happens because low fundamental risk leads to higher equilibrium leverage." (Brunnermeier and Sannikov [10] ) 5 In addition to Bernanke and Gertler [7] , papers that have found small or no welfare bene…ts from leaning-against …nancial variables include Ajello et al [3] , Angeloni and Faia [4] , Faia and Monacelli [19] , De Groot [16] , Quint and
Rabanal [34] , and Svensson [39] . 6 It is also important to note that as opposed to Svensson [39] and Ajello et al [3] the severity of …nancial stress and its welfare implications are endogenous in our setup.
The Model
The speci…cation of the macroeconomic block of the model follows standard New-Keynesian DSGE models (Christiano et al., [14] ; Smets and Wouters, [37] ) whereas the …nancial sector is modeled as in He and Krishnamurthy [28] . Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy has three sectors:
households, …nancial intermediation, and goods production. We assume that the capital stock is owned by …nancial intermediaries which are run by a manager. We interpret the intermediaries to include both commercial banks, as well as non-banks (such as investment banks, hedge funds and private equity funds).
Household Sector
A representative household maximizes the expected utility ‡ow:
where is the discount factor and C t and L t denotes consumption and labor e¤ort respectively.
The instantaneous utility function is speci…ed as in Greenwood et. al. [25] , eliminating the wealth e¤ect on labor supply
where the inverse of inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, 1= L is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The parameter > 0 is used for accounting for the steady state of L t , while h captures external habit formation on consumption.
Households maximize their objective function subject to an intertemporal budget constraint which is given by: 7
where W t is …nancial wealth and w t = w n t =P t is the real wage expressed in terms of …nal consumption, P t is the price of the …nal consumption bundle while the last term represents nominal wage adjustment costs. Households are assumed to not be able to directly own the capital stock-even though they own capital producers which rebate their pro…ts D k t to households. Instead, households invest their wealth in risky and risk-free assets issued directly by the …nancial sector. More precisely, a minimum fraction of household wealth is channeled into risk-free deposits, B t , for transaction and liquidity services that earn a gross real return R f t 1 = (1 + i t 1 )-where i t 1 is the nominal risk-free rate. The real risk-free rate governs the consumption-saving choice of the households through a standard Euler equation: 8 E t u c;t+1 u c;t
where t is the in ‡ation rate of consumption prices P t while the marginal utility of consumption is
The other fraction 1 is invested either in risky …nancial assets V t which earn a stochastic returnR t ; or in deposits. Both returns are taken as given. The portfolio choice of investing in risky …nancial liabilities of a …nancial intermediary depends on the "reputation", e t , acquired by the …nancial intermediary. We assume that for each intermediary the following relation holds (where W is steady state wealth) 9
When = 1, during good times the share of household wealth invested in risky asset is constant,
. In bad times, however, when the …nancial sector is perceived fragile the equity share t falls with e t . As we will see, choosing = 1 is consistent with the empirical observation that …nancial sector leverage is procyclical.
Finally, we describe wage setting and labor supply. The marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is given by the ratios of marginal utilities
Following the New-Keynesian tradition, we assume the households have market power in setting their nominal wages such that the nominal wage expressed in …nal consumption goods price is a markup over the household marginal rate of substitution w n t = w;t mrs t 8 The real risk-free rate can be de…ned implicitly as R ]: 9 The household portfolio allocation between risky and safe assets is price insensitive. Implicitly, we are assuming that there are limits to arbitrage and deposits and intermediary equity are not close substitute. Hence, there is no direct arbitrage equation linking the return on equity and the return on risk-less deposits. As we will see, asset prices (the price of physical capital) equilibrate demand and supply of risky funds to the …nancial sector. The consumption-saving choice, however, is still captured by the Euler equation on bonds while evolution of the wage markup w;t is determined by nominal rigidities in setting wages such that the following wage Phillips curve governs wage in ‡ation w;t = t w t =w t 1 w;t = (1 w )E t w;t+1 + w w;t 1 w ( w;t ss ):
The cost of wage in ‡ation is born by the household and amounts to a loss of resources equal to 0:5 cw 2 w;t Y : The parameter cw is a function of w such that in a …rst order approximation adjustment costs a la Rotemberg and Calvo would give the same dynamics (see Lombardo and Vestin [32] ).
Real Sector (Production)
Following the New-Keynesian framework, there is a continuum of monopolist …rms that produce di¤erentiated goods according to the technology
where the demand for individual …rm's output is given by y t = (p t =P t ) Y t . The law of motion for physical capital is given by
however, since …rms are owned by intermediaries the investment decision, I t , is actually driven by …nancial intermediaries (see next section).
The labor demand is given by
Firms face price adjustment costs a la Rotemberg, governed by the parameter cp , which imply the following non-linear Phillips curve for price in ‡ation 10
The parameter cp is a function of parameter of a traditional New-Keynesian Phillips curve, p , such that in a …rst order approximation adjustment costs a la Rotemberg and Calvo would give 1 0 We assume …rms are risk neutral when it comes to the price-setting decision, instead of discounting the future using the intermediary discount factor. This assumption has no implication since we introduce both wages and prices
Phillips curve in a …rst order approximation to reduce the potential instability of the system. the same dynamics (see Lombardo and Vestin [32] ). The marginal cost mc is function of the factor prices (wage and rental rate of capital) and TFP:
Total factor productivity is a stationary exogenous process governed by a temporary and persistent shock " A t and " g t ,respectively
Capital goods producers Capital goods producers, owned by households, buy output I t to produce investment goods (new capital) which are sold to the intermediary sector at a price Q t . 11 Since there is no di¤erence between new and old capital, the real value of the capital stock is simply q t K t , where q t = Q t =P t . Hence, the intermediary sector's valuation of capital, q t , also drives investment. Given q t , investment is chosen to solve
where (I t =K t ; K t ) = 0:5 (I t =K t ) 2 K t is the second term in cost function which depends on aggregate capital while technology is such that new units of physical capital are equal to output used as inputs e I t = I t . Optimality implies 12
Capital producers rebate their pro…ts to households which are zero only in the deterministic steady state:
Financial Sector
There is a separation between the ownership and control of an intermediary, and a manager makes all investment decisions of the intermediary. The manager raises funds from households in two 1 1 In the deterministic steady state capital producers make zero pro…ts. A qt > 1 (qt < 1) implies positive (negative)
)Kt 1 2 Notice that the relation between investment and q is the same as the one prevailing in presence of capital adjustment costs in a traditional real business cycle model (Hayashi 1982) . 1 3 It is straightforward to see that pro…ts are positive if and only if qt > 1:
forms, equity and debt W t = V t + B t which are used to purchase capital. The goal of the manager is to maximize his reputation which is determined by the history of realized returns on intermediary equity e t = e t 1 mR t ;
where m > 0 is a constant describing the risk aversion of the manager andR is the intermediary's real return on equity which is a combination of the return on investment and the cost of funds
where t > 1 is the …nancial intermediaries leverage which ampli…es the return on investment R t .
In other words, t is the ratio of assets and the equity raised by an intermediary while t 1 is the debt-to-equity ratio. In equilibrium, we have that t = W t =V t and t 1 = B t =V t . As far as the equity premium is positive E t R t+1 R f t > 0 higher leverage is expected to increase the …nancial intermediary's return on equity. A macroprudential tool, t , is available to the government and will be described below.
Optimal leverage is determined by maximizing the manager's expected life-time (log) reputation which is consistent with the traditional mean-variance portfolio strategy 14
where e E t R t+1 = E t R t+1 + t and t can be interpreted as a demand shock which follows a …rst order autoregressive process. The realized return on investment is given by
The Sharpe ratio is de…ned as the risk premium on an investment divided by its risk:
where R t+1 = p var t (R t+1 ). The Sharpe ratio is equal to the riskiness of the intermediary portfolio, t R t+1 , times the risk aversion of the …nancial intermediary m. If the intermediary sector bears more risk in its portfolio the Sharpe ratio will rise.
It is instructive to consider the amplifying e¤ects of a binding capital constraint. If e t < (1 )W W shock in this state reduces W t = q t K t , but reduces e t = V t more through two channels. First, since the intermediary sector is levered the return on equity is a multiple of the underlying return on the intermediary sector's assets. Second, reputation, e t , moves more than one-for-one with the return on equity since the risk aversion of the …nancial intermediary, m, is larger than one (e t = e t 1 mR t ).
Hence, negative shocks are ampli…ed and cause leverage to actually rise when the capital constraint binds. Higher leverage implies a higher Sharpe ratio on capital investment, S a t , which in turn implies that the price of capital, q t , must be lower in order to deliver the higher expected returns (from 2.5). A lower price of capital will in turn further depress investment which depends on q t .
We can de…ne the mis-pricing of risk as
Notice that in the absence of …nancial frictions ! t = 0 at all times (see Appendix). The mispricing of risk is counter-cyclical in that there is underpricing of risk during good times and vice versa.
This distortion is also a key feature of the model that helps understand why risks can buildup during good times.
Monetary Policy
We assume that the monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate according to a simple Taylor-type rule (Taylor [41] ) where the risk-free nominal rate responds to its lagged value, price and wage in ‡ation, a measure of economic activity x, and a zero-mean measure of …nancial vulnerability (leverage or mispricing of risk) # t ,
where c t is a composite wage and price in ‡ation index. 15 We also append a monetary policy shock m t , which is possibly autocorrelated, when we study the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Macroprudential Policy
Within our framework there are two related motives for a macro-prudential policy that encourages banks to use outside equity and discourages the use of short term debt. First, households do 1 5 In models with both sticky prices and wages it can be proved that under some conditions it is optimal to respond to the composite in ‡ation index. In our baseline setup, a parameter w ' 0:5 gives a good welfare performance. not fully internalize the systemic e¤ect of their portfolio allocation choices and their investment in equity is price insensitive. Second, investment decision by …nancial intermediaries are driven by the objective of maximizing total returns in a way that does not fully capture the household preference for risk and their externality on asset prices. The two distortions imply that risk is mispriced and, thus, asset prices are distorted.
A macroprudential policy
reacts to deviations of leverage from its unconditional mean, increasing the cost of issuing debt during periods of high leverage. The rule reduces the sensitivity of the …nancial sector to shocks hitting the real economy. In the stationary equilibrium the tax is set to make the macroprudential policy neutral (we set = 0 while E( t E t ) = 0), so that the net impact on intermediary's revenues is zero. However, the policy raises the relative attractiveness to intermediaries of issuing outside equity. 16 
Equilibrium conditions and Aggregation
Goods market clearing implies that output is either consumed or invested
The value of the …nancial sector portfolio has to be equal to the overall households' …nancial investment in the …nancial intermediaries:
Finally, aggregating reputation e t across …nancial intermediaries, S t ; since a given manager may die at any date at a constant Poisson intensity of > 0, the law of motion of the aggregate health (reputation) of the …nancial sector S t is
hence, in equilibrium, the overall …nancial sector equity is given by
Quantitative analysis
In this section we show that the model has reasonable quantitative properties. We then use the model to evaluate the performance of alternative monetary policy rules. 17 Non-linear models should preferably be solved with global methods. Due to the curse of dimensionality, however, these can be applied only to relatively small models with a limited number of state variables. Following
Dewatcher and Wouters [17] we replace the occasionally binding constraint (2.6) with a di¤erentiable function
which captures the essential features of the equity constraint, which is higher cost of raising equity during bad times. 18 
Calibration
The two Tables below list the Dewachter and Wouters [17] ) with the exception of which governs the procyclicality of leverage.
The annual discount rate, , is set at 0:96 and the steady-state returns are de…ned consistently with this parameter. The depreciation rate, , is assumed to be 10%. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution for the households, , and the inverse of the Frisch labor elasticity, L , are both set equal to one. The habit parameter is equal to 0:3. The CD-labor share, , is set at 0:6. We calibrate the demand and supply processes to match data moments of macroeconomic variables. We use postwar US data from 1960Q1 to 2014Q2, for PCE in ‡ation, real GDP, private consumption, and private business …xed investment to match growth rate volatilities with the ones implied by the model. 19 The model is able to replicate the standard deviations of key macro variables during normal times and during recessions (de…ned using the NBER recession dating) and the fall in average growth between normal times and recessions (see Table 1 ). 20 Parameter We also choose our parameter such that the correlation between leverage and the value of …nancial intermediaries'portfolio W t is as in the data during normal times and during crisis periods. 1 9 We simulate the model, starting from the deterministic steady state, for 3,000 periods. We discard the …rst 500 periods as a burn-in to eliminate the transition from the deterministic steady state of the model to the ergodic distribution of the state variables. 2 0 Bad times are de…ned using the NBER recession dating. Standard deviations for both normal and bad times are centered around the unconditional sample mean.
As documented by Adrian and Shin [1] changes in debt are correlated with changes in the value of total assets while changes in equity are mostly uncorrelated to total assets. The interpretation is that …nancial intermediaries expand their balance sheet by issuing debt rather than raising equity.
The exception is severe …nancial crisis periods when …re sales reduce the value of assets while the value of liabilities is mostly unchanged. If equity is marked to market then the value of equity follows the reduction in total assets. Figure 1 shows that the model is able to replicate these salient features of the data for broker dealers. As pointed out in the literature, however, the procyclicality of commercial bank leverage (and the change in the size of their balance sheet) is substantially lower. Hence, to the extent that overall …nancial sector leverage is less pro-cyclical than brokerdealer leverage, our calibration is biased in favor of monetary policy leaning against leverage.
[ Figure 1 . Cyclical Properties of Debt and Equity].
Following He and Krishnamurthy [28] we de…ne systemic crisis as periods where the equity constraint binds. In this situation the elasticity of equity to reputation is equal to 1 (V t = S t ).
Our use of a di¤erentiable function makes makes the de…nition of a systemic crisis slightly more arbitrary since the constraint is a¤ecting the economy also for situations when the elasticity of equity to reputation is less than 1. Hence, we de…ne recessions as periods of moderate to strong …nancial stress when the elasticity is greater than 0:5 which implies a threshold for reputation of S t < 0:95. We de…ne a systemic crisis when reputation is below 0:83 which implies an elasticity of equity to reputation greater than or equal to one. Under the baseline calibration the probability of a systemic crisis is about 3 percent, i.e. systemic crisis occur approximately every thirty years on average. This probability is chosen to re ‡ect the observation that there have been three major …nancial crises in the US over the last 100 years. Finally, a severe systemic crisis is de…ned, on technical grounds, as a situation when reputation falls below a certain threshold which, in our third order approximation, implies a negative value for equity. This is a point of no return after which the system becomes unstable. Under our chosen approximation of the equity investment constraint, we pass the point of no return when S t < 0:66.
Model Analysis
In this section we will explore how the model behaves under the baseline calibration. Since we use a third-order approximation, we also consider how impulse response functions change with the state of the economy: between a state with average reputation and a state with low reputation (a "bad" state).
Financial cycle vs. business cycle
Empirical literature has documented that the business cycle and the …nancial cycle (de…ned according to the choice of some …nancial variables) are not perfectly aligned (see Borio [9] ). This observation has often been brought forward as evidence of a trade-o¤ between systemic risk and output and in ‡ation stabilization goals. Figure 2 shows the cross-correlation function between detrended output and leverage in the model and in the data (both in percent). Under the baseline calibration we …nd that leverage is more persistent than de-trended output (top left and bottom right hand side subplots in each panel show autocorrelations) and lags the business cycle. In the data, broker-dealer leverage is also positively and signi…cantly correlated with the output gap, with the highest correlation at a few quarters lag.
[ Figure 2 . Correlation between Output and Leverage]
4.2. Impact of a real shock to the …nancial sector and the ampli…cation mechanism The same mechanism is ampli…ed by the equity constraint in a bad state when …nancial sector reputation is already low. In this case we observe a sudden drop in the capacity of the …nancial sector to bear risk that exacerbates the initial reduction in investment and output. The equity premium (asset prices) increases (decrease) more substantially while leverage increases rather than decreasing in the baseline state.
[ Figure 3 . Negative Total Factor Productivity Shock]
Impact of a monetary policy shock on the …nancial sector
A surprise monetary policy tightening has a negative impact on output, in ‡ation, and asset prices.
Coupled with an increase in funding costs and the equity premium, this implies a reduction in the …nancial sector return on investment which reduces its reputation at impact. In general, the monetary policy shock leads to a reduction in leverage, however, if the surprise happens during a bad state the more persistent fall in asset prices-coupled with a deeper fall in output and in ‡ation-triggers a sharper reduction in …nancial equity which can actually lead to a subsequent increase in leverage. The monetary policy surprise leads to losses without persistently altering risk taking behavior in the …nancial sector, which are more a¤ected by the systematic monetary policy behavior (see below). The impact on systemic risk is, thus, mixed and is state dependent.
In the bad state, after 4 quarters the probability of a more fragile …nancial sector (with negative reputation) after a surprise monetary policy tightening is actually higher than in absence of the shock.
[ Figure 4a . and 4b. Monetary Policy Tightening Shock]
Welfare Analysis
Following Faia and Monacelli [19] and Gertler and Karadi [21] , among others, we express the household utility function recursively 21 :
where U t = E t P 1 j=0 j u (C t+j ; L t+j ) denotes the utility function. We take a third-order approximation of U t around the deterministic steady state. Using the third-order solution of the model, we then calculate the unconditional expectation of the utility U = E [U t ] (i.e., welfare, where E denotes the unconditional expectations operator) in each of the separate cases of monetary and macroprudential policies. We rank alternative policies in terms of a steady state consumption equivalent, , given by the fraction of consumption loss required to equate welfare in the deterministic steady state, U ss ( ); to one resulting from using monetary and macroprudential policies, U . Hence the measure of welfare we use is the consumption equivalent value required for the household to be indi¤erent between U ss ( ) and U . A higher (less negative) implies a lower consumption equivalent value is required for the household to be indi¤erent between the alternatives and hence indicates that the policy is more desirable from a welfare point of view. By imposing
To …nd the optimal simple monetary and macroprudential policy rules, we then search numer- To compute welfare, we simulate the model for 100 years (400 quarters) after dropping the …rst 500 observations and compute the average value of U t : If during the simulation reputation drops below a point of no return (about S t < 0:66) we record the outturn as unstable (severe crisis) and move on to draw another seed. We repeat it until we have N stable simulations. Finally, since some policy rules dramatically change the stability properties of the model we penalize instability by adjusting welfare and de…ne adjusted (weighted) welfare as the average computable welfare times the frequency of stable simulations.
Results in absence of systemic risk
The standard New Keynesian results prevail in the absence of …nancial frictions. In particular, since the model includes nominal wage rigidities, it is optimal for the central bank to target a composite index which takes into account also wage in ‡ation (see e.g. Erceg et al [18] ). 23 Also, once the composite in ‡ation index is su¢ ciently stabilized, reacting to the level of output is not welfare improving (see Figure 5 ). 24 Hence, we con…rm the results in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [36] who also …nd that it is welfare reducing to respond to output. Since traditional results were derived in a linear-quadratic approach, our …ndings suggest that, in the absence of …nancial frictions, timevarying risk premia and higher order non-linearities do not alter the traditional policy prescription. 2 2 We will present the results in terms of 100 ( 1):Notice also that since the steady state is distorted it is possible, in principle, to obtain a > 0. 2 3 The reason is that ‡uctuations in both wage and price in ‡ation and the output gap, generate a resource misallocation and a welfare loss. Hence, optimal policy should strike the right balance between stabilization of those three variables. The optimal policy can be approximated by a policy that stabilizes a weighted average of price and wage in ‡ation, where the appropriate weights are function of the relative stickiness of prices and wages. 2 4 An intuition for why a policy of responding to output is not appropriate in response to supply shocks such as a technology shock, is that under such policy the nominal interest rate rises whenever output rises. This increase in the nominal interest rate in turn hinders prices falling by as much as marginal costs causing markups to increase.
With an increase in markups, output does not increase as much as it would have otherwise, preventing the e¢ cient rise in output.
We will take these results as our benchmark against which we evaluate how the optimal simple rule can be augmented with …nancial variables once the …nancial sector is introduced.
[ Figure 5 . Welfare: Baseline without Systemic Risk ]
Reacting to output: the volatility paradox
Reacting to output (in addition to the usual prescription of the model without …nancial frictions) implies a reduction of macroeconomic volatilities, such as output volatility, during periods or relatively mild shocks-at the cost of higher in ‡ation volatility. Compressing macroeconomic volatility, by reducing risk premia, also generates lower real rates which in turn increase asset prices and, thus, investment and capital stock above their e¢ cient levels-average output is indeed higher. As a result, the …nancial sector has to …nance, through borrowing and higher leverage, a larger investment portfolio. Even though apparently in better shape because of higher asset prices the …nancial sector is actually more vulnerable to boom-bust cycles when a series of benign shocks, which further increase leverage and compress risk premia, is followed by a series of negative shocks. Overall, depending on the severity of the crisis, welfare can be negatively a¤ected by the intensi…cation of tail events ( Figure 7) . Indeed, the number of simulations where reputation drops below its lower bound threshold increases. Hence, a reaction to output over and above the usual reaction is not warranted by …nancial stability issues.
[ 
Reacting to leverage: risk of …nancial dominance and unintended consequences
A systematic reaction to leverage improves welfare in normal times. However the improvement is small: a modest reaction to leverage, with ' 0:28, which would typically induce a change in the policy rate that is 3 to 5 bps larger than otherwise, improves welfare by about 0:25 percent in terms of steady state consumption equivalent, under the baseline calibration (see Figure 6 and 8).
Indeed, a modest systematic monetary policy of leaning against the wind implies a reduction in both in ‡ation and output volatility. These results, however, are sensitive to the parametrization.
First, the result depends on leverage being procyclical. Second, even when leverage is indeed procyclical, a higher weight on leverage in the monetary policy rule increases the frequency of severe crises (see Figure 8) . As a result, even if the unadjusted welfare increases with a higher weight on leverage, the welfare measure adjusted for the probability of crisis eventually decreases as the weight on leverage increases. The reason is that crises are periods of sharp drops in asset prices, which lead to a reduction in equity greater than the reduction in debt-putting upward pressure on leverage. Hence, a policy rule that reacts to increases in leverage in these circumstances can exacerbate a crisis, penalizing our adjusted welfare metric. Indeed, even though the mass of leverage is more concentrated around a lower value, the tails of the distribution are actually larger ( Figure 9 
Reacting to mis-pricing of risk: a modest e¤ect
The reaction to the mis-pricing of risk, # t = ! t ; entails less destabilization. However, the overall welfare e¤ects are smaller. The optimal coe¢ cient found is 0:56. Increasing the reaction does not lead to increased instability of the system but the bene…ts in terms of welfare vanish even in the presence of relatively mild shocks. Mis-pricing of risk is therefore not highly a¤ected by monetary policy and as a result not a very appealing intermediate target (see Figure 10 ).
[ Figure 10 . Welfare: Risk Mis-pricing vs. Output stabilization]
Macroprudential policy
A macroprudential policy rule (similar to a countercyclical capital requirement) which imposes a countercyclical tax on …nancial intermediaries, thus increasing the cost of funding when it is low and leverage is high, delivers the largest welfare improvement across our rules. In particular, …gure 11
shows that leaning-against-leverage performed through macroprudential policy relative to interest rate policy gives a relative welfare bene…t up to 1:2% of steady state consumption equivalent. This di¤erence is explained by the fact that the macroprudential policy is more targeted and aims at breaking the negative feedback loop which links equity availability to the …nancial sector and asset prices (low returns-low equity-low asset prices-low returns). In comparison a policy rate that reacts to leverage is a blunt tool which, in an e¤ort to stabilize leverage, tends to destabilize in ‡ation and reduce output. Indeed, the welfare increases from the macroprudential policy do not derive from stabilizing only in good times but also by mitigating the probability and severity of systemic events in the …nancial sector.
[ Figure 11 . Systematic policy based on a simple (Taylor type) policy rule that includes …nancial variables such as leverage, can improve welfare by striking a balance between in ‡ation and output stabilization on the one hand and reducing the likelihood of …nancial stress on the other. A simple policy reaction to leverage, however, is not robust and is too simplistic. First, leaning against the wind requires that …nancial sector leverage is pro-cyclical. As discussed above, empirical evidence is mixed and suggests that pro-cyclicality varies across sectors and over time. Second, even if leverage is pro-cyclical, when leverage increases because of a sharp fall in asset prices, an increase in policy interest rates exacerbates the initial asset price correction. Leaning against leverage without clearly distinguishing why leverage is increasing could therefore lead to a policy mistake that exacerbates incipient …nancial stress, possibly inducing a full blown crisis. This result suggests that the monetary policy reaction should go beyond the simple rule described here. Alternative rules could incorporate a non-linear response that di¤erentiates between leaning against the wind in normal times and crisis response one the economy is moving towards …nancial stress. Alternative …nancial variables such as measures of mis-pricing of risk have more appealing properties which make them preferable to react to in a simple rule. However, they are less a¤ected by monetary policy, leading to only modest welfare improvements. Finally, a simple macroprudential rule which acts similarly to a counter-cyclical capital requirement (making it more costly to raise debt during good times and vice versa) is substantially better than the interest policy rule in limiting the buildup of leverage and preventing crisis.
.
The E¢ cient Allocation
We will solve for the (constrained) e¢ cient allocation when the …nancial sector is a veil and all nominal rigidities are eliminated.
Household Sector (no …nancial sector) A representative household maximizes the expected utility ‡ow:
where is the discount factor and C t and L t denotes consumption and labor e¤ort respectively. The instantaneous utility function is speci…ed as in the text while the intertemporal budget constraint which is given by:
Capital producers rebate their pro…ts Div cp t to households which are assumed to invest directly in the capital stock, I, and rent it to …rms for a return r k . New capital is purchased at a price q from capital producers. The law of motion of physical capital is
The optimal intertemporal condition for capital accumulation provides the following intertemporal condition.
When the price of capital is expected to raise, capital gains adds to the rental rate of capital.
The labor supply is given by
Household (explicit …nancial sector) It is possible to split the household problem in introduce a …nancial sector. Assume household do not accumulate physical capital directly but own …nancial intermediaries which, in turn, invest in physical capital and own …nal goods …rms. The household budget constraint is modi…ed to include the possibility of buying banks'shares and in risk-free debt with banks:
The household maximization problem gives two equations in addition to the consumption-leisure choice:
It is also possible to de…ne V t = p s t x t , e R t+1 = (p s t+1 + d t+1 )=p s t and W t = V t + B t such that we have
Accumulation of physical capital is done by banks. Since q t is the price of (new and old ) installed capital, the value of total capital is q t K t : The bank can issue shares and one-period debt. The bank maximizes current and future dividends per share using the discount factor m t;t+j : 25
subject to
The consolidated budget constraint is also identical to the previous one. We de…ne the adjusted discount factor asm t;t+1 = m t;t+1 x t 1 =x t :The …rst order conditions, after some algebra, are analog 2 5 The timing is as follows: banks can use debt and cash ‡ow from physical capital to pay dividends to the current
where N dt 0 are non distributed dividends (retained earnings). After that, new shares are potentially issued to investment together with retained earnings qtIt = p s t xt + N dt. Hence, new shares will receive tomorrow's dividends consistently with the convention used in the household problem to determined demand for shares. Only when the constraint is binding N dt = 0 the two problems di¤er. We assume it does not bind.
to .2
If the bank is rasing capital to …nance investment then it discounts more future returns. If
uc;t , equilibrium in the bond market implies that E tmt;t+1 = E t m t;t+1 x t 1 =x t = E t m t;t+1 , which implies x t = x t 1 . Hence, allocation is the same as above and the banking sector is a veil.
.2. Real Sector (Production)
Following the New Keynesian framework, there is a continuum of monopolist …rms that produce di¤erentiated goods according to the technology
where the demand for individual …rm's output is given by y t = (p t =P t ) Y t , while they pay wages w and rental rates r k for labor and capital: We already impose the equilibrium condition that demand for capital is equal to the supply K d t = K t .The marginal cost mc t is function of the factor prices (wage and rental rate of capital) and TFP. In equilibrium, since prices are ‡exible, is equal to the inverse of the markup p = =( 1).
We choose = Y =( 1) to guarantee zero pro…ts in the non-stochastic steady state. 26 Capital goods producers Capital goods producers, owned by households, produce investment goods (new capital) which are sold to the intermediary sector at a price q t . 27 Hence, the intermediary sector's valuation of capital, q t , also drives investment. Given q t , investment is chosen to solve,
where (I t =K t 1 ; K t ) = 0:5 (i t ) 2 K t is a cost function which depends on aggregate capital and include capital adjustment costs. Optimality implies 28
In the deterministic steady state capital producers earn zero pro…t, however, when q t > 1 (q t < 1)
we they earn positive (negative) pro…ts: Div 2 )K t .
Resource Constraint (Equilibrium) The equilibrium in the capital market implies that K d t = K t 1 :The equilibrium in the good market implies that output is 29 Y t = C t + I t + (I t =K t 1 ; K t 1 ) 2 7 In the deterministic steady state capital producers make zero pro…ts. A q > 1 (q < 1) implies positive (negative) pro…ts: divt = (qt 1)( + q t 1 2 )Kt 2 8 Notice that the relation between investment and qt is the same as the one prevailing in presence of capital adjustment costs in a traditional real business cycle model (Hayashi [27] ). 2 9 It is straightforward to derive the resource constraint from budget constraint of the household. Note: X-axis is the weight on leverage in both the macroprudential and interest rate rule. Welfare is expressed in terms of weighted steady state consumption equivalent.
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